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A Stackelberg Game of Backward Stochastic
Differential Equations with Applications ∗
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Abstract: This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg game of backward stochastic differential
equations (BSDEs), where the coefficients of the backward system and the cost functionals are
deterministic, and the control domain is convex. Necessary and sufficient conditions of the op-
timality for the follower and the leader are first given for the general problem, by the stochastic
maximum principles of BSDEs and forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBS-
DEs), respectively. Then a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg game of BSDEs is investigated
under standard assumptions. The state feedback representation for the optimal control of the
follower is first given via two Riccati equations. Then the leader’s problem is formulated as
an optimal control problem of FBSDE with the control-independent diffusion term. Two high-
dimensional Riccati equations are introduced to represent the state feedback for the optimal
control of the leader. The solvability of the four Riccati equations are discussed. Theoretic re-
sults are applied to an optimal consumption rate problem of two players in the financial market.
Keywords: Stackelberg differential game, backward stochastic differential equation, maxi-
mum principle, linear-quadratic control, optimal consumption rate
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1 Introduction
The Stackelberg game, also known as the leader-follower game, has been an active research
topic in recent years. Among various dynamic games, the Stackelberg game has the hierarchical
structure of decision making between the players, which are appealing in both theory and appli-
cations. The Stackelberg solution to the game is achieved when one of the two players is forced
to wait until the other player announces his strategy, before making his own decision. Problems
of such sequential nature arise frequently in economics, where decisions must be made by two
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parties and one of them is subordinated to the other, and hence must wait for the other party’s
decision before formulating its own.
The research of Stackelberg game can be traced back to the pioneering work by Stackelberg
[30] in static competitive economics. Simann and Cruz [29] studied the dynamic LQ Stackel-
berg differential game, and the Stackelberg solution was expressed in terms of Riccati equations.
Bagchi and Basar [1] investigated the stochastic LQ Stackelberg differential game, where the
diffusion term of the state equation does not contain the state and control variables. Existence
and uniqueness of its Stackelberg solution are established, and the leader’s optimal strategy is
solved as a nonstandard stochastic control problem and is shown to satisfy a particular inte-
gral equation. Yong [36] extended the stochastic LQ Stackelberg differential game to a rather
general framework, where the coefficients could be random matrices, the control variables could
enter the diffusion term of the state equation and the weight matrices for the controls in the
cost functionals need not to be positive definite. The problem of the leader is first described
as a stochastic control problem of an FBSDE. Moreover, it is shown that the open-loop so-
lution admits a state feedback representation if a new stochastic Riccati equation is solvable.
Øksendal et al. [19] proved a maximum principle for the stochastic Stackelberg differential
game when the noise is described as an Ito-Le´vy process, and found applications to a continuous
time manufacturer-newsvendor model. Bensoussan et al. [2] proposed several solution concepts
in terms of the players’ information sets, for the stochastic Stackelberg differential game with
the control-independent diffusion term, and derived the maximum principle under the adapted
closed-loop memoryless information structure. Xu and Zhang [35] studied both discrete- and
continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential games with time delay. By introducing a new
costate, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg
equilibrium was presented and was designed in terms of three decoupled and symmetric Riccati
equations. Shi et el. [26] solved a stochastic leader-follower differential game with asymmetric in-
formation, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ-algebra of that
available to the leader. Stochastic maximum principles and verification theorems with partial
information were obtained. An LQ stochastic leader-follower differential game with noisy ob-
servation was solved via measure transformation, stochastic filtering, where not all the diffusion
coefficients contain the state and control variables. In Shi et al. [27], an LQ stochastic Stackel-
berg differential game with asymmetric information was researched, where the control variables
enter both diffusion coefficients of the state equation, via some forward-backward stochastic
differential filtering equations (FBSDFEs). In Li and Yu [12], a kind of coupled FBSDE with
a multilevel self-similar domination-monotonicity structure was introduced to characterize the
unique equilibrium of an LQ generalized Stackelberg game with multilevel hierarchy in a closed
form. Moon and Bas¸ar [18] considered a LQ mean field Stackelberg differential games with one
leader and arbitrarily large number of followers. Xu et al. [34] studied a leader-follower stochas-
tic differential game with time delay appearing in the leaders control. The open-loop solution
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is explicitly given in the form of the conditional expectation with respect to several symmetric
Riccati equations, with the nonhomogeneous relationship between the forward variables and the
backward ones obtained in the optimization problems of both the follower and the leader. Lin et
al. [16] considered the open-loop LQ Stackelberg game of the mean-field stochastic systems in
finite horizon. A sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg strategy
in terms of the solvability of some Riccati equations is presented. Furthermore, it was shown
that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium admits a feedback representation involving the new
state and its mean. Some recent progress about Stackelberg games can be seen in a review paper
by Li and Sethi [13] and the references therein.
A BSDE is an Itoˆ’s stochastic differential equation (SDE) in which a prescribed terminal
condition y(T ) = ξ is given. The BSDE admits an adapted solution pair (y(·), z(·)) under
some conditions, where the additional term z(·) is required for the solutions to the equation
being adapted processes. This is essentially different from forward SDEs. The linear BSDEs
are initially introduced by Bismut [3]. The theory of general nonlinear BSDEs is established
by Pardox and Peng [20], and Duffie and Epstein [8], with applications to many fields such as
optimal control, partial differential equation, differential game, mathematical finance, option
pricing, etc. Two recent monographs about BSDEs can be seen in Pardoux and Rascanu [21]
and Zhang [40].
Since BSDEs are well-defined dynamic systems, it is very natural and appealing to study the
control and game problems involving BSDEs. The optimal control problem of BSDEs was first
studied by Peng [22, 23] and El Karoui et al. [9], when solving the recursive utility maximization
problems. Dokachev and Zhou [7] studied a nonlinear stochastic control problem of BSDEs.
A necessary condition of optimality in the form of a global maximum principle as well as a
sufficient condition of optimality are presented. The general result is also applied to backward
LQ (BLQ) control problem and an optimal control is obtained explicitly as a feedback of the
solution to a FBSDE. In Chen and Zhou [4], when a general optimization model of stochastic
LQ regulators with indefinite control cost weighting matrices is studied, a subproblem with a
backward dynamics is proposed and studied. Lim and Zhou [15] studied the general BLQ control
problem by the completion-of-squares technique, and the relationship between the BSDE and
the forward LQ stochastic control problem. The optimal control is represented as a feedback
of the entire history of the state. Huang et al. [10] studied a BLQ control problem with
partial information, the explicit solutions for the optimal control are obtained in terms of some
FBSDFEs. Zhang [39] studied a BLQ control problem with random jumps. Shi [24] researched
an optimal control problem of BSDEs with time delayed generators. Lou and Li [17] and Li et
al. [14] studied the BLQ control problem for mean-field case.
The differential game problem of BSDEs was initially studied by Yu and Ji [38], and the
explicit form of a Nash equilibrium point was given for the LQ non-zero sum case. Wang and
Yu [32] established necessary and sufficient conditions of the Nash equilibrium point for the
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non-zero sum stochastic differential game of BSDEs. Then Wang and Yu [33] considered the
partial information case, and a verification theorem which is a sufficient condition for the Nash
equilibrium point was established. Shi and Wang [25] studied a non-zero sum differential game
of BSDEs with time-delayed generator. An Arrow’s sufficient condition for the Nash equilibrium
point is proved. Huang et al. [11] studied a backward mean-field LQ Gaussian games of weakly
coupled stochastic large population system. Wang et al. [31] focused on a kind of LQ non-zero
sum differential game of BSDEs with asymmetric information. Du et al. [5] studied the mean-
field game of N weakly-coupled linear BSDE system. Very recently, an LQ Stackelberg game for
mean-field backward stochastic systems was studied by Du and Wu [6].
Inspired by the above literatures, in this paper we consider a Stackelberg game of BSDEs,
where the coefficients of the backward system and the cost functionals are deterministic, and the
control domain is convex. The novelty of the formulation and the contribution in this paper is
the following. (1) A new kind of general Stackelberg game of BSDEs is introduced and studied
by the maximum principle approach, where a terminal condition ξ is given in advance. (2)
For the LQ case, first, two Riccati equations, a linear BSDE and a linear SDE are introduced
to get the state feedback form for the optimal control of the follower. See Theorem 4.2 and
the chart below it. Then, two high-dimensional Riccati equations, a linear BSDE and a linear
SDE are introduced to represent the optimal control of the leader as the state feedback form.
See Theorem 4.4 and the chart below it. (3) The solvability of the four Riccati equations are
discussed. (4) An optimal consumption rate problem of two players in the financial market is
studied, the Stackelberg equilibrium point is represented and the optimal initial wealth reserve
is obtained explicitly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the general Stackelberg game of
BSDEs is formulated. And this general problem is studied in Section 3. The follower’s problem
of the BSDE is considered first in Subsection 3.1, while the leader’s problem of the FBSDE
is studied in Subsection 3.2. By the maximum principle approach, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the optimal controls of the follower and the leader’s are given. In Section 4,
the LQ Stackelberg game of BSDEs is investigated. Via two Riccati equations, the optimal
control of the follower is given in the state feedback form. And the optimal control of the
leader is represented as the state feedback form by the solutions to two high-dimensional Riccati
equations. The solvability of these Riccati equations is also discussed, and the optimal solution
to the LQ Stackelberg game of BSDEs is derived. In Section 5, the results in the previous
sections are applied to an optimal consumption rate problem of two players in the financial
market. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
4
2 Problem Formulation
In this paper, we use Rn to denote the Euclidean space of n-dimensional vectors, Rn×d to denote
the space of n× d matrices, and Sn to denote the space of n× n symmetric matrices. 〈·, ·〉 and
| · | are used to denote the scalar product and norm in the Euclidean space, respectively. A ⊤
appearing in the superscript of a matrix, denotes its transpose. fx, fxx denote the first- and
second-order partial derivatives with respect to x for a differentiable function f , respectively.
Let T > 0 be fixed. Consider a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a standard d-
dimensional Brownian motionW (t) withW (0) = 0, which generates the filtration Ft = σ{W (r) :
0 ≤ r ≤ t} augmented by all the P-null sets in F . Throughout this paper, L2FT (Ω,R
n) will denote
the set of Rn-valued, FT -measurable random vectors, L
2
F (0, T ;R
n) will denote the set of Rn-
valued, Ft-adapted, square integrable processes on [0, T ], L
2
F (0, T ;R
n×d) will denote the set of
n× d-matrix-valued, Ft-adapted, square integrable processes on [0, T ], and L
∞(0, T ;Rn×d) will
denote the set of n× d-matrix-valued, bounded functions on [0, T ].
Let us consider the following controlled BSDE:{
−dy(t) = f(t, y(t), z(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt − z(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y(T ) = ξ.
(2.1)
Here ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n) is given and (y(·), z(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n)×L2F(0, T ;R
n×d) is the state process
pair. u1(·) ∈ U is the control process of the follower, and u2(·) ∈ U is the control process of the
leader, where U is a nonempty convex subset of Rk.
We define the cost functional of the follower and the leader as
Ji(u1(·), u2(·); ξ) = E
{∫ T
0
Li(t, y(t), z(t), u1(t), u2(t))dt+ hi(y(0))
}
, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
and the admissible control sets are given by
Ui[0, T ] =
{
ui(·) ∈ L
2
F (0, T ;R
k)
∣∣ui(t) ∈ U, a.e, a.s.}, i = 1, 2, (2.3)
respectively.
In (2.1) and (2.2), f(t, y, z, u1, u2) : [0, T ] × R
n × Rn×d × Rk × Rk → Rn, Li(t, y, z, u1, u2) :
[0, T ] × Rn × Rn×d × Rk × Rk → R, hi(y) : R
n → R are given functions. Now we introduce the
following assumption that will be in force throughout this paper.
(A1) The functions f(t, y, z, u1, u2), Li(t, y, z, u1, u2), hi(y) are continuous.
(A2) The functions f(t, y, z, u1, u2), Li(t, y, z, u1, u2), hi(y) are twice continuously differen-
tiable with respect to y, z. Moreover, the following inequalities hold.
|Li(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |hi(y)| ≤ C0(|y|
2 + |z|2 + 1),
|f(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |Liy(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |Liz(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |hy(y)| ≤ C1(|y|+ |z|+ 1),
|fy(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |fzj(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |fyy(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |Liyy(t, y, z, u1, u2)|
+ |Lizjzj(t, y, z, u1, u2)|+ |hiyy(y)| ≤ C2,
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where Ck > 0 are constants, k = 0, 1, 2, and zj , j = 1, · · · , d are the columns of the matrix z.
The problem studied in this paper is proposed in the following definition.
Definition 2.1. The pair (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) ∈ U1[0, T ]× U2[0, T ] is called an optimal solution to the
Stackelberg game of BSDEs, if it satisfies the following condition:
(i) For given ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n) and any u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], there exists a map Γ : U2[0, T ] ×
L2FT (Ω,R
n)→ U1[0, T ] such that
J1(Γ(u2(·), ξ), u2(·); ξ) = min
u1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
J1(u1(·), u2(·); ξ). (2.4)
(ii) There exists a unique u¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that
J2(Γ(u¯2(·), ξ), u¯2(·); ξ) = min
u2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
J2(Γ(u¯2(·), ξ), u2(·); ξ). (2.5)
(iii) The optimal strategy of the follower is u¯1(·) = Γ(u¯2(·), ξ).
3 The general problem
3.1 Optimization for the follower
Let ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n) be given. Giving the leader’s strategy u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], assume that the
process u¯1(·) is an optimal control of the follower, and (y¯(·), z¯(·)) be the corresponding trajectory.
Let x(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n) satisfy the following adjoint equation

dx(t) =
{
fy(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤x(t) + L1y(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤
}
dt
+
d∑
i=1
{
fzi(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤x(t)
+ L1zi(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤
}
dWi(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = h1y(y¯(0))
⊤,
(3.1)
and the Hamiltionian function H1 : [0, T ] × R
n × Rn×d × Rk × Rk × Rn → R is defined as
H1(t, y, z, u1, u2, x) = −〈x, f(t, y, z, u1, u2)〉 − L1(t, y, z, u1, u2). (3.2)
The following two results are direct from Theorems 3.1 and 5.1 of [7].
Theorem 3.1. (Necessary Conditions for Optimality) Under the assumptions (A1) and (A2),
let ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n). Giving the leader’s strategy u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], let u¯1(·) be the optimal control
of the follower and (y¯(·), z¯(·)) be the corresponding trajectory. Then for any u1(·) ∈ U , we have
〈H1u1(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t), x(t)), u1(t)− u¯1(t)〉 ≥ 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (3.3)
where x(·) is the solution to the adjoint equation (3.1).
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Theorem 3.2. (Sufficient Conditions for Optimality) Under the assumptions (A1) and (A2),
let ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n). Giving the leader’s strategy u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], assume the function h1(·) is
convex, and the function H1(t, ·, ·, ·, u2, x) is concave and Lipschitz continuous. Then u¯1(·) is an
optimal control of the follower’s problem if it satisfies (3.3), where x(·) is the solution to (3.1).
3.2 Optimization for the leader
Since the follower’s optimal response u¯1(·) can be determined by the leader, the state equation
of leader has the following form as an FBSDE:

dx(t) =
{
fy(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤x(t) + L1y(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤
}
dt
+
d∑
i=1
{
fzi(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤x(t) + L1zi(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))
⊤
}
dWi(t),
−dy¯(t) = f(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u2(t))dt − z¯(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = h1y(y¯(0))
⊤, y¯(T ) = ξ.
(3.4)
Then we introduce the Hamiltonian H2 : [0, T ]×R
n×Rn×d×Rk×Rk×Rn×Rn×Rn×d×Rn → R
as
H2(t, y, z, u1, u2, x, p, k, q) = 〈p, b(t, y, z, u1, u2, x)〉+ 〈k, σ(t, y, z, u1, u2, x)
+ 〈q, f(t, y, z, u1, u2)〉+ L2(t, y, z, u1, u2, x),
(3.5)
where we denote b(t, y, z, u1, u2, x) ≡ fy(t, y, z, u1, u2)
⊤x+L1y(t, y, z, u1, u2)
⊤, σ(t, y, z, u1, u2, x) ≡∑d
i=1
[
fzi(t, y, z, u1, u2)
⊤x+ L1zi(t, y, z, u1, u2)
⊤
]
.
Let u¯2(·) be an optimal control of the leader and (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·)) be the corresponding tra-
jectory. Let (p(·), k(·), q(·)) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R
n)×L2F (0, T ;R
n×d)×L2F (0, T ;R
n) satisfy the following
adjoint equation

−dp(t) = H2x(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), k(t), q(t))dt − k(t)dW (t),
dq(t) = H2y(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), k(t), q(t))dt
+H2z(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), k(t), q(t))dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(T ) = 0, q(0) = h2x(y¯(0)).
(3.6)
The following result belongs to [23].
Theorem 3.3. (Necessary Conditions for Optimality) Assuming (A1) and (A2) hold, let u¯2(·)
be the optimal control, and (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·)) be the corresponding trajectory with y¯(T ) = ξ. Then
for any u2(·) ∈ U , we have〈
H2u2(t, y¯(t), z¯(t), u¯1(t), u¯2(t), x¯(t), p(t), k(t), q(t)), u2(t)− u¯2(t)
〉
≥ 0, a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (3.7)
where (p(·), k(·), q(·)) is the solution to the adjoint equation (3.6).
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We also examine when the necessary condition of optimality (3.7) becomes sufficient.
Theorem 3.4. (Sufficient conditions for Optimality) Assuming (A1) and (A2) hold, let u¯2(·) be
an admissible control, and (x¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·)) be the corresponding trajectory with y¯(T ) = ξ. Suppose
the function h2(·) is convex and the function H2(t, ·, ·, ·, u¯1(t), ·) is convex, and (q(·), p(·), k(·))
is the solution to (3.6). Then u¯2(·) is an optimal control if it satisfies (3.7).
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.2 of Shi and Wu [28], without random jumps.
4 The linear quadratic problem
4.1 Optimization for the follower
In this section, we consider the following controlled linear BSDE{
−dy(t) =
[
A(t)y(t) +B1(t)u1(t) +B2(t)u2(t) + C(t)z(t)
]
dt− z(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y(T ) = ξ,
(4.1)
where A(·), B1(·), B2(·), C(·) are given deterministic matrix-valued functions. We suppose the
following assumption:
(L1) A(·), C(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×n), B1(·), B2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Rn×k).
Then we define the cost functional of the follower
J1(u1(·), u2(·); ξ) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q1(t)y(t), y(t)〉 + 〈R1(t)u1(t), u1(t)〉
+ 〈S1(t)z(t), z(t)〉
]
dt+ 〈G1y(0), y(0)〉
}
. (4.2)
And we suppose (L2)
{
Q1(·), S1(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sn), Q1(·), S1(·) ≥ 0,
R1(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sk), R1(·) > 0, G1 ∈ S
n, G1 ≥ 0.
Problem (LQBSDEf). For given ξ ∈ L
2
FT
(Ω,Rn) and any u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], find a u¯1(·) ∈
U1[0, T ] such that
J1(u¯1(·), u2(·); ξ) = min
u1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
J1(u1(·), u2(·); ξ). (4.3)
Applying Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we first obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Under the assumptions (L1) and (L2), let ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n). Giving the leader’s
strategy u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], then the optimal control of the follower u¯1(·) satisfies the following
condition:
B1(t)
⊤x(t) +R1(t)u¯1(t) = 0, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.4)
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where (x(·), y¯(·), z¯(·)) is the solution to the FBSDE:

dx(t) =
[
A(t)⊤x(t) +Q1(t)y¯(t)
]
dt+
[
C(t)⊤x(t) + S1(t)z¯(t)
]
dW (t),
−dy¯(t) =
[
A(t)y¯(t) +B1(t)u¯1(t) +B2(t)u2(t) + C(t)z¯(t)
]
dt− z¯(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y¯(T ) = ξ, x¯(0) = G1y¯(0).
(4.5)
Moreover, we have the following relations:{
y¯(t) = −P1(t)x(t)− φ(t),
z¯(t) = −[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)C(t)
⊤x(t) + η(t)],
(4.6)
where the deterministic and differentiable function P1(·) is the solution to the following equation

P˙1(t) +A(t)P1(t) + P1(t)A(t)
⊤ − P1(t)Q1(t)P1(t) +B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
+ C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤ = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
P1(T ) = 0,
(4.7)
and the process pair (φ(·), η(·)) is the solution to the following BSDE

−dφ(t) =
{
[A(t) − P1(t)Q1(t)]φ(t) + C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1η(t)−B2(t)u2(t)
}
dt
− η(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
φ(T ) = −ξ.
(4.8)
Therefore, we can get the optimal control of the follower:
u¯1(t) = −R
−1
1 (t)B
−1
1 (t)
⊤x(t), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.9)
with any given leader’s control u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] through the adjoint process x(·) of the FBSDE
(4.5).
Next, we intend to obtain the state feedback form of u¯1(·). Firstly, we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Under the assumptions (L1) and (L2), let (x(·), y¯(·), z¯(·)) be the solution to the
Hamiltonian system (4.4)-(4.5). Then
x(t) = P2(t)y¯(t) + ϕ(t), a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.10)
where P2(·) satisfies the following Riccati equation

P˙2(t)− P2(t)A(t) −A(t)
⊤P2(t)−Q1(t) + P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
+ P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤P2(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
P2(0) = G1,
(4.11)
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and ϕ(·) is given by the following SDE:

dϕ(t) =
{[
− P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ − P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤
+A(t)⊤
]
ϕ(t) + P2(t)B2(t)u2(t)− P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1η(t)
}
dt
+
{
[P1(t)P2(t) + I][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤[I + P2(t)P1(t)]
−1ϕ(t)
− [P1(t)P2(t) + I][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤[I + P2(t)P1(t)]
−1P2(t)φ(t)
+ [P2(t)− S1(t)][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1η(t)
}
dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕ(0) = 0.
(4.12)
Proof. Since (x(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), u¯1(·)) is the optimal 4-tuple of the Hamiltonian system (4.4)-(4.5),
then substituting (4.9) into the system, noting the second relation of (4.6), we rewrite the BSDE
as: 

−dy¯(t) =
{
A(t)y¯(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤x(t) +B2(t)u2(t)
− C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)C(t)
⊤x(t) + η(t)]
}
dt
+ [P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)C(t)
⊤x(t) + η(t)]dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y¯(T ) = ξ.
(4.13)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to (4.10), where we let ϕ(·) satisfy{
dϕ(t) = α(t)dt + β(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕ(0) = 0,
(4.14)
and make a comparison with system (4.5), we get

{
P˙2(t)− P2(t)A(t) −A(t)
⊤P2(t)−Q1(t) + P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
+ P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤P2(t)
}
y¯(t) +
{
P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
+ P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤ −A(t)⊤
}
ϕ(t)− P2(t)B2(t)u2(t)
+ P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1η(t) + α(t) = 0,
β(t) = [P2(t)− S1(t)][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)C(t)
⊤x(t) + η(t)]
+C(t)⊤P2(t)y¯(t) + C(t)
⊤ϕ(t).
(4.15)
Therefore, it implies that P2(·) satisfies the Riccati equation (4.11). From the first relation in
(4.6) and (4.10), we have
x(t) = −P2(t)[I + P2(t)P1(t)]
−1φ(t) + [I + P2(t)P1(t)]
−1ϕ(t). (4.16)
Thus, combining (4.6), (4.14), (4.15) and (4.16), we get that ϕ(·) is given by (4.12). The proof
is complete.
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Remark 4.1. We introduce, in Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.1, two Riccati equations for P1(·)
and P2(·) to build the relation between y¯(·) and x(·). Similarly to [15], we can obtain the unique
solvability of these two Riccati equations, and the unique solvability of (4.8) and (4.12), with
the solutions (φ(·), η(·)) and ϕ(·) respectively, is evident as they are linear BSDE and SDE with
bounded deterministic coefficients and square integrable nonhomogeneous terms.
Based on the above lemma, we obtain the optimal state feedback of u¯1(·) in the follower’s
problem.
Theorem 4.2. Under the assumptions (L1) and (L2), for any given ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n) and
u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ], the problem (LQBSDEf) is solvable with the optimal strategy u¯1(·) being of a
feedback representation
u¯1(t) = −R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤[P2(t)y¯(t) + ϕ(t)], (4.17)
where P2(·) and ϕ(·) are the solutions to (4.11) and (4.12), respectively. The optimal state
trajectory (y¯(·), z¯(·)) is the unique solution to the BSDE:

−dy¯(t) =
{[
A(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
y¯(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ϕ(t)
+B2(t)u2(t) + C(t)z¯(t)
}
dt− z¯(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y¯(T ) = ξ.
(4.18)
Proof. For given ξ and u2(·), let P1(·) satisfy (4.7), by the standard BSDE theory we can solve
(4.8) to obtain (φ(·), η(·)). Let P2(·) satisfy (4.11), and by the standard SDE theory we can
solve (4.12) to obtain ϕ(·). Thus the feedback representation (4.17) can be obtained from (4.16)
and (4.6). The proof is complete.
We can draw a flow chart to show the process in which we could represent the optimal feed-
back u¯1(·).
Given u2 and ξ
P1 satisfies (4.7)
}
(φ, η) satisfies (4.8)
P2 satisfies (4.11)
}
ϕ satisfies (4.12)
x satisfies (4.16)(y¯, z¯) satisfies (4.6)u¯1 satisfies (4.17)
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4.2 Optimization for the leader
In the above subsection, for any given ξ and u2(·), we have obtained the feedback form (4.17)
of the follower’s optimal control u¯1(·). Now we let problem (LQBSDEf) be uniquely solvable
for any given (ξ, u2(·)) ∈ L
2
FT
(Ω;Rn) × U2[0, T ]. Since the follower’s optimal strategy u¯1(·) of
feedback form (4.17) can be determined by the leader, the leader could take it into account in
finding and announcing his optimal strategy. Consequently, from (4.12) and (4.18), noting (4.6),
the leader has the following state equation:

dϕ(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
]
ϕ(t) + P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1
× P1(t)C(t)
⊤P2(t)y¯(t) + P2(t)C(t)z¯(t) + P2(t)B2(t)u2(t)
}
dt
+
{[
[P1(t)P2(t) + I][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤ − [P2(t)− S1(t)][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1
× P1(t)C(t)
⊤
]
ϕ(t) +
[
[P1(t)P2(t) + I][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤P2(t)
− [P2(t)− S1(t)][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
y¯(t)
− [P2(t)− S1(t)]z¯(t)
}
dW (t),
−dy¯(t) =
{[
A(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
y¯(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ϕ(t)
+B2(t)u2(t) + C(t)z¯(t)
}
dt− z¯(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y¯(T ) = ξ, ϕ(0) = 0.
(4.19)
For any given ξ and u2(·), from the proof of Theorem 4.2, the solvability for the solution
(ϕ(·), y¯(·), z¯(·)) to (4.19) can be guaranteed though it is fully coupled.
The leader would like to choose his control u2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that his cost functional
J2(u¯1(·), u2(·); ξ) =
1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
〈Q2(t)y¯(t), y¯(t)〉+ 〈R2(t)u2(t), u2(t)〉
+ 〈S2(t)z¯(t), z¯(t)〉
]
dt+ 〈G2y¯(0), y¯(0)〉
} (4.20)
is minimized. And we suppose (L3){
Q2(·), S2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sn), Q2(·), S2(·) ≥ 0,
R2(·) ∈ L
∞(0, T ;Sk), R2(·) > 0, G2 ∈ S
n, G2 ≥ 0.
The optimal control problem for the leader can be stated as follows.
Problem (LQFBSDEl). For given ξ ∈ L
2
FT
(Ω,Rn), find a u¯2(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that
J2(u¯1(·), u¯2(·); ξ) = min
u2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
J2(u¯1(·), u2(·); ξ). (4.21)
Applying Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, we first obtain the following result.
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Theorem 4.3. Let the assumptions (L1), (L2) and (L3) hold. Let (ϕ¯(·), y¯(·), z¯(·), u¯2(·)) be
the optimal 4-tuple of system (4.19) for the terminal state ξ ∈ L2FT (Ω,R
n). Then we have the
following stationary condition:
B2(t)
⊤P2(t)p(t) +B2(t)
⊤q(t) +R2(t)u¯2(t) = 0, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s., (4.22)
where (p(·), k(·), q(·)) satisfies the following adjoint FBSDE


dq(t) =
{
P2(t)C(t)P1(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤P2(t)p(t) +
[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)
×R−11 (t)B1(t)
⊤
]
q(t) +
[
P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)P2(t) + I]
− P2(t)C(t)P1(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P2(t)− S1(t)]
]
k(t) +Q2(t)y¯(t)
}
dt
+
{
C(t)⊤P2(t)p(t) + C(t)
⊤q(t)− [P2(t)− S1(t)]k(t) + S2(t)z¯(t)
}
dW (t),
−dp(t) =
{[
A(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
p(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤q(t)
+
[
C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)P2(t) + I]− C(t)P1(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1
× [P2(t)− S1(t)]
]
k(t)
}
dt− k(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
q(0) = G2y¯(0), p(T ) = 0.
(4.23)
Remark 4.2. For notations simplicity, we still denote the optimal state (y¯(·), z¯(·)) of the leader
as that in the follower’s problem, while denote the third (auxiliary) optimal state of the leader
as ϕ¯(·) when in the follower’s problem ϕ(·) is the adjoint process.
Similar to [36], here we use the same technique to solve the optimization problem for the
leader. We expect to obtain some kind of state feedback representation for the optimal control
u¯2(·) via a certain Riccati equation. To make the problem clearer, let us put (4.19), (4.22) and
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(4.23) together:

dϕ¯(t) =
{[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤
]
ϕ¯(t) + P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1
× P1(t)C(t)
⊤P2(t)y¯(t) + P2(t)C(t)z¯(t) + P2(t)B2(t)u¯2(t)
}
dt
+
{[
[P1(t)P2(t) + I][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤ − [P2(t)− S1(t)]
× [P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1P1(t)C(t)
⊤
]
ϕ¯(t) +
[
[P1(t)P2(t) + I]
× [P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤P2(t)− [P2(t)− S1(t)][P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1
× P1(t)C(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
y¯(t)− [P2(t)− S1(t)]z¯(t)
}
dW (t),
dq(t) =
{
P2(t)C(t)P1(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1C(t)⊤P2(t)p(t) +
[
A(t)⊤ − P2(t)B1(t)
×R−11 (t)B1(t)
⊤
]
q(t) +
[
P2(t)C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)P2(t) + I]
− P2(t)C(t)P1(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P2(t)− S1(t)]
]
k(t) +Q2(t)y¯(t)
}
dt
+
{
C(t)⊤P2(t)p(t) + C(t)
⊤q(t)− [P2(t)− S1(t)]k(t) + S2(t)z¯(t)
}
dW (t),
−dy¯(t) =
{[
A(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
y¯(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤ϕ¯(t)
+B2(t)u¯2(t) + C(t)z¯(t)
}
dt− z¯(t)dW (t),
−dp(t) =
{[
A(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤P2(t)
]
p(t)−B1(t)R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤q(t)
+
[
C(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1[P1(t)P2(t) + I]− C(t)P1(t)[P1(t)S1(t) + I]
−1
× [P2(t)− S1(t)]
]
k(t)
}
dt− k(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
ϕ¯(0) = 0, q(0) = G2y¯(0), y¯(T ) = ξ, p(T ) = 0,
(4.24)
Note that the equations for (y¯(·), z¯(·), ϕ¯(·)) form a coupled FBSDE, and those for (p(·), k(·), q(·))
form another coupled FBSDE. These two FBSDEs are further coupled through their initial
and/or terminal conditions and (4.22). Hence, the above is a coupled system of FBSDEs. We
may look at the above in a different way. To this end, let us set (The time variable t is omitted.)
X =
(
ϕ¯
q
)
, Y =
(
p
y¯
)
, Z =
(
k
z¯
)
, Gˆ2 =
(
0 0
0 G2
)
, ξˆ =
(
0
ξ
)
, (4.25)
and
Aˆ1 =
(
A−B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 P2 0
0 A−B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 P2
)
, Bˆ1 =
(
P2B2
0
)
, Bˆ2 =
(
0
B2
)
,
Cˆ1 =
(
(P1P2 + I)(P1S1 + I)
−1C⊤ − (P2 − S1)(P1P2 + I)
−1P1C
⊤ 0
0 C⊤
)
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Dˆ1 =
(
0 P2C
P2C(P1S1 + I)
−1(P1P2 + I)− P2CP1(P1S1 + I)
−1(P2 − S1) 0
)
,
Fˆ1 =
(
0 P2C(P1S1 + I)
−1P1C
⊤P2
P2CP1(P1S1 + I)
−1C⊤P2 Q2
)
,
Fˆ2 =
(
0 −B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1
−B1R
−1
1 B
⊤
1 0
)
, Sˆ1 =
(
0 −(P2 − S1)
−(P2 − S1) S2
)
,
then (4.24) is equivalent to the FBSDE:

dX(t) =
[
Aˆ⊤1 X(t) + Fˆ1Y (t) + Dˆ1Z(t) + Bˆ1u¯2(t)
]
dt
+
[
Cˆ1X(t) + Dˆ
⊤
1 Y (t) + Sˆ1Z(t)
]
dW (t),
−dY (t) =
[
Fˆ2X(t) + Aˆ1Y (t) + Cˆ
⊤
1 Z(t) + Bˆ2u¯2(t)
]
dt− Z(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = Gˆ2Y (0), Y (T ) = ξˆ,
Bˆ⊤1 Y (t) + Bˆ
⊤
2 X(t) +R2(t)u¯2(t) = 0, a.e.t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
(4.26)
Noting that (4.26) is a coupled FBSDE with initial condition coupling, while the diffusion
term of the forward equation is control independent. This is a new feature different from that
in the (forward) leader-follower differential game studied in [36]. In the following, we try to
decouple the above FBSDE using the similar technique as in Subsection 4.1.
Suppose we have the relation{
Y (t) = −Π1(t)X(t) − φ˜(t), Π1(T ) = 0,
− dφ˜(t) = α˜(t)dt− η˜(t)dW (t), φ˜(T ) = −ξˆ.
(4.27)
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to Y (·), and make comparison with system (4.26), we have

Fˆ2X(t) + Aˆ1Y (t) + Cˆ
⊤
1 Z(t) + Bˆ2u¯2(t)−Π1Aˆ
⊤
1 X(t)−Π1Fˆ1Y (t)
−Π1Dˆ1Z(t)−Π1Bˆ1u¯2(t)− Π˙X(t) + α˜(t) = 0,
Z(t) + Π1Cˆ1X(t) + Π1Dˆ
⊤
1 Y (t) + Π1Sˆ1Z(t) + η˜(t) = 0.
(4.28)
Noting the last relation in (4.26), it implies the following equation of Π1(·) and φ˜(·):

Π˙1 + Aˆ1Π1 +Π1Aˆ
⊤
1 −Π1Fˆ1Π1 + (Π1Bˆ1 − Bˆ2)R
−1
2 (Bˆ
⊤
1 Π1 − Bˆ
⊤
2 )
+ (Cˆ⊤1 −Π1Dˆ1)(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1(Cˆ1 − Dˆ
⊤
1 Π1)− Fˆ2 = 0,
Π1(T ) = 0,
(4.29)


−dφ˜(t) =
{[
Aˆ1 −Π1Fˆ1 + (Π1Bˆ1 − Bˆ2)R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 + (Π1Dˆ1 − Cˆ
⊤
1 )(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1Dˆ
⊤
1
]
φ˜(t)
− (Π1Dˆ1 − Cˆ
⊤
1 )(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1η˜(t)
}
dt− η˜(t)dW (t),
φ˜(T ) = −ξˆ.
(4.30)
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Then we suppose {
X(t) = Π2(t)Y (t) + ϕ˜(t), Π2(0) = Gˆ2,
dϕ˜(t) = β˜(t)dt+ γ˜(t)dW (t), ϕ˜(0) = 0.
(4.31)
Applying the Itoˆ’s formula to X(·), and make comparison with system (4.26) we have

Aˆ⊤1 X(t) + Fˆ1Y (t) + Dˆ1Z(t) + Bˆ1u¯2(t) + Π2Fˆ2X(t) + Π2Aˆ1Y (t) + Π2Cˆ
⊤
1 Z(t)
+ Π2Bˆ2u¯2(t)− Π˙2Y (t)− β˜(t) = 0,
Π2Z(t) + γ˜(t)− Cˆ1X(t) − Dˆ
⊤
1 Y (t)− Sˆ1Z(t) = 0.
(4.32)
From the above relationship between X(·) and Y (·) in (4.27) and (4.31), we can obtain{
X(t) = (I +Π2Π1)
−1
[
−Π2φ˜(t) + ϕ˜(t)
]
,
Y (t) = −(I +Π1Π2)
−1
[
Π1ϕ˜(t) + φ˜(t)
]
.
(4.33)
Combining this with the relations with regard to Z(·) in (4.28), (4.32), we can get

Π˙2(t) = Π2Aˆ1 + Aˆ
⊤
1 Π2 +Π2Fˆ2Π2 − (Bˆ1 +Π2Bˆ2)R
−1
2 (Bˆ1 +Π2Bˆ2)
⊤
− (Dˆ1 +Π2Cˆ
⊤
1 )(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1(Dˆ
⊤
1 + Cˆ1Π2) + Fˆ1,
Π2(0) = Gˆ2,
(4.34)
and ϕ˜(·) satisfy the following equation{
dϕ˜(t) = β˜(t)dt+ γ˜(t)dW (t),
ϕ˜(0) = 0,
(4.35)
with

β˜(t) =
{
Aˆ⊤1 +Π2Fˆ2 − (Bˆ1 +Π2Bˆ2)R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 − (Dˆ1 +Π2Cˆ
⊤
1 )(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1Cˆ1
}
ϕ˜(t)
− (Dˆ1 +Π2Cˆ
⊤
1 )(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1η˜(t),
γ˜(t) = −
{
Dˆ⊤1 (I +Π1Π2)
−1Π1 + (Π2 − Sˆ1)(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1Dˆ
⊤
1 (I +Π2Π1)
−1Π1
− Cˆ1(I +Π2Π1)
−1 − (Π2 − Sˆ1)(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1Cˆ1(I +Π2Π1)
−1
}
ϕ˜(t)
−
{
Dˆ⊤1 (I +Π1Π2)
−1 + (Π2 − Sˆ1)(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1Dˆ
⊤
1 (I +Π2Π1)
−1
+ Cˆ1(I +Π2Π1)
−1Π2 + (Π2 − Sˆ1)(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1Π1Cˆ1(I +Π2Π1)
−1Π2
}
φ˜(t)
+ (Π2 − Sˆ1)(I +Π1Sˆ1)
−1η˜(t).
(4.36)
We have the following result.
Theorem 4.4. Under assumptions (L1), (L2) and (L3), suppose the Riccati equations (4.29)
and (4.34) admit differentiable solutions Π1(·) and Π2(·), respectively. Then Problem (LQFBSDEl)
is solvable with the optimal strategy u¯2(·) being of a feedback representation
u¯2(t) = −R
−1
2 (t)
[
Bˆ1 +Π2Bˆ2
]⊤
Y (t)−R−12 (t)Bˆ
⊤
2 ϕ˜(t), (4.37)
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where ϕ˜(·) satisfies (4.35), and the optimal state trajectory (Y (·), Z(·)) satisfies the BSDE


−dY (t) =
{[
Aˆ1 + Fˆ2Π2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 (t)
(
Bˆ1 +Π2Bˆ2
)⊤]
Y (t) + Cˆ⊤1 Z(t)
+ (Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 (t)Bˆ
⊤
2 )ϕ˜(t)
}
dt− Z(t)dW (t),
Y (T ) = ξˆ.
(4.38)
Proof. For given ξ, let Π1(·) satisfy (4.29), by the standard BSDE theory we can solve (4.30) to
obtain (φ˜(·), η˜(·)). Let Π2(·) satisfy (4.34), and by the standard SDE theory we can solve (4.35)
to obtain ϕ˜(·). Thus the feedback representation (4.37) can be obtained from the BSDE (4.38).
The proof is complete.
We can also draw a flow chart to show the process in which we could represent the optimal
feedback u¯2(·).
Given ξ
Π1 satisfies (4.29)
}
(φ˜, η˜) satisfies (4.30)
Π2 satisfies (4.34)
}
ϕ˜ satisfies (4.35)
(Y,Z) satisfies (4.33)u¯2 satisfies (4.37)
In the rest part of this section, we concentrate on the solvability of the two Riccati equations
(4.29), (4.34) of Π1(·) and Π2(·). For simplicity, we will just consider the constant coefficient
case.
We first discuss the solvability for (4.29) of Π1(·). However, in this paper we consider only
the case of C = 0, and it is easy to get that Cˆ1 = Dˆ1 = 0. Then we can rewrite (4.29) to another
form: 

Π˙1(t) + (Aˆ1 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 )Π1(t) + Π1(t)(Aˆ
⊤
1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )
+ Π1(t)(Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 − Fˆ1)Π1(t) + Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 − Fˆ2 = 0,
Π1(T ) = 0.
(4.39)
Then according to Theorem 5.2 of Yong [37], we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Let (L1), (L2) hold, C = 0, and det
{(
0, I
)
eAt
(
0
I
)}
> 0, t ∈ [0, T ]
17
hold. Then, (4.39) admits a unique solution Π1(·) which has the following representation
Π1(t) = −
[(
0, I
)
eA(T−t)
(
0
I
)]−1 (
0, I
)
eA(T−t)
(
I
0
)
, (4.40)
where
A ,
(
Aˆ⊤1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 − Fˆ1
Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 −Aˆ1 + Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1
)
. (4.41)
Then, we use the similar method to discuss the solvability for the Riccati equation (4.34) of
Π2(·). Firstly we make the time reversing transformation:
τ = T − t, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then, in the case of C = 0, we can also obtain an equivalent form of (4.34):

Π˙2(t) + Π2(t)(Aˆ1 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 ) + (Aˆ
⊤
1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Π2(t)
+ Π2(t)(Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Π2(t) + Fˆ1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 = 0,
Π2(T ) = Gˆ2,
(4.42)
Next, we introduce the following Riccati equation:

Π˙2,1(t) + Π2,1(t)
[
Aˆ1 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 + (Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Gˆ2
]
+
[
Aˆ⊤1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 + Gˆ2(Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )
]
Π2,1(t)
+ Π2,1(t)(Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Π2,1(t) + Gˆ2(Aˆ1 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 ) + (Aˆ
⊤
1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Gˆ2
+ Gˆ2(Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Gˆ2 + Fˆ1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 = 0,
Π2,1(T ) = Gˆ2.
(4.43)
It is easy to see the solution Π2,1(·) to (4.43) and that Π2(·) to (4.42) are related by the following:
Π2(t) = Gˆ2 +Π2,1(t), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.44)
Therefore, similarly to the above discussion which is proved in [37], we have the following result.
Proposition 4.2. Let (L1), (L2), (L3) hold, C = 0, and det
{(
0, I
)
eBt
(
0
I
)}
> 0, t ∈
[0, T ] hold. Then, (4.43) admit unique solution Π2,1(·) which has the following representation
Π2,1(t) = −
[(
0, I
)
eB(T−t)
(
0
I
)]−1 (
0, I
)
eB(T−t)
(
I
0
)
, (4.45)
where we let 

Φ , Aˆ1 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 + (Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Gˆ2,
Ψ , Gˆ2(Aˆ1 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 ) + (Aˆ
⊤
1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Gˆ2
+ Gˆ2(Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2 )Gˆ2 + Fˆ1 − Bˆ1R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
1 ,
B ,
(
Φ Fˆ2 − Bˆ2R
−1
2 Bˆ
⊤
2
Ψ −Φ⊤
)
.
(4.46)
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Furthermore, (4.44) gives the solution Π2(·) to the Riccati equation (4.34).
Finally, the optimal strategy u¯1(·) of the follower can also be represented in a similar way as
u¯2(·). In fact, by (4.17), (4.31), we have
u¯1(t) = −R
−1
1 (t)B1(t)
⊤[P2(t)y¯(t) + ϕ¯(t)]
= −R−11 (t)B1(t)
⊤
[
(0, P2(t))Y (t) + (I, 0)X(t)
]
= −R−11 (t)B1(t)
⊤
[
(0, P2) + (I, 0)Π2
]
Y (t)−R−11 (t)B1(t)
⊤(I, 0)ϕ˜(t).
(4.47)
Up to now, we have obtained the optimal solution (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) to the LQ Stackelberg game
of BSDEs, whose state feedback representation are given by (4.47) and (4.37).
5 Application in finance
In this section, we consider an optimal consumption rate problem of two players in the financial
market, which can be formulated as an LQ Stackelberg game of BSDEs. Then the theoretic
results in the previous sections can be applied, and in fact, it motivates us the study of our
problems.
Suppose in the financial market, the investors have two tradable assets. One is a risk-free
asset (bond or bank account) whose price dynamic is given by the following ordinary differential
equation (ODE):
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt, t ≥ 0, S0(0) = s0, (5.1)
where r(t) is called the interest rate. The other one is a risky asset (stock or investment fund)
whose price dynamic is subject to the following SDE:
dS1(t) = S1(t)[µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW (t)], t ≥ 0, S1(0) = s1, (5.2)
where µ(·) and σ(·) are called the instantaneous rate of return and instantaneous volatility,
respectively. In this section, we assume that the above market coefficients r(·), µ(·) and σ(·) are
deterministic and bounded functions, and µ(t) ≥ r(t) for any t ≥ 0.
Suppose there are two agents (players) working together to invest the bond and the stock,
whose decision has no influence on the prices in the financial market. One of the agents is the
follower, who has an instantaneous consumption rate c1(·), and the other one is the leader, who
has an instantaneous consumption rate c2(·).
Now, the two players wish to achieve a terminal wealth goal ξ at the terminal time T , where
ξ is an FT -measurable non-negative square-integrable random variable. We use pi(·) to represent
the amount that the two players invest in the stock. Then the value y(·) of their wealth process
is modeled by{
dy(t) =
[
r(t)y(t) + (µ(t)− r(t))pi(t)− c1(t)− c2(t)
]
dt+ pi(t)σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y(T ) = ξ.
(5.3)
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If we set z(·) = pi(·)σ(·), then we can rewrite the above equation as

−dy(t) =
[
− r(t)y(t)−
µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
z(t) + c1(t) + c2(t)
]
dt− z(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
y(T ) = ξ.
(5.4)
Let Ui =
{
ci(·)
∣∣ci(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R), t ∈ [0, T ]}, i = 1, 2, and each ci(·) ∈ Ui(·) is called an
admissible control. For any (c1(·), c2(·)) ∈ U1×U2, the BSDE (5.4) admit a unique solution pair
(y(·), z(·)) in L2F (0, T ;R)× L
2
F (0, T ;R).
Now, we define the associated expected utility functionals
Ji(u1(·), u2(·); ξ) =
1
2
E
∫ T
0
Ri(t)c
2
i (t)dt−Giy
2(0), i = 1, 2, (5.5)
where Ri(·) > 0 is a deterministic function and Gi ≥ 0 is a constant. For the two players, it is
natural to desire to maximize his expected utility functional representing cumulative consump-
tion and to minimize the initial reserve.
This is an LQ Stackelberg game of BSDEs in the financial market. The target of this section
is to find the optimal solution (c¯1(·), c¯2(·)) ∈ U1×U2, which is the Stackelberg equilibrium point,
as in Definition 2.1.
Obviously, this problem can be regarded as a special case of that in Section 4. Therefore,
we can use the results (Theorems 4.2 and 4.4) to solve it. Noting (4.1), (4.2) and (4.20), we
know in this section A(t) = −r(t), B1(t) = B2(t) = 1, C(t) = −
µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t) , Q1(t) = Q2(t) = 0 and
S1(t) = S2(t) = 0, for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Firstly, we solve the follower’s problem. For given ξ and any c2(·) ∈ U2, using Theorem 4.2,
we can get
c¯1(t) = −
P2(t)y¯(t) + ϕ(t)
R1(t)
, (5.6)
where (y¯(·), z¯(·)) satisfy the following BSDE:

−dy¯(t) =
{
−
[P2(t)
R1(t)
+ r(t)
]
y¯(t)−
µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
z(t)−
ϕ(t)
R1(t)
+ c2(t)
}
dt− z¯(t)dW (t),
y¯(T ) = ξ,
(5.7)
P1(·) and P2(·) satisfy the following Riccati equations:

P˙1(t) +
[(µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
)2
− 2r(t)
]
P1(t) +
1
R1(t)
= 0,
P1(T ) = 0,
(5.8)


P˙2(t) +
[
1
R1(t)
+ P1(t)
(µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
)2]
P 22 (t) + 2r(t)P2(t) = 0,
P2(0) = G1,
(5.9)
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respectively, and (ϕ(·), φ(·), η(·)) satisfy the following FBSDE:

dϕ(t) =
{[
−
P2(t)
R1(t)
+
(µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
)2
P1(t)P2(t)− r(t)
]
ϕ(t)
+
µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
P2(t)η(t) + P2(t)c2(t)
}
dt
+
{
−
µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
ϕ(t) +
µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
P2(t)φ(t) + P2(t)η(t)
}
dW (t),
−dφ(t) =
{
− r(t)φ(t)−
µ(t)− r(t)
σ(t)
η(t)− c2(t)
}
dt− η(t)dW (t),
ϕ(0) = 0, φ(T ) = −ξ.
(5.10)
Next, we solve the leader’s problem. Noting (4.25) and putting
Aˆ1(t) =
(
−r(t)− P2(t)
R1(t)
0
0 −r(t)− P2(t)
R1(t)
)
, Bˆ1(t) =
(
P2(t)
0
)
, Bˆ2 =
(
0
1
)
,
Cˆ1(t) =
(
−1−P 2
2
(t)P 2
1
(t)−P2(t)P1(t)
P1(t)P2(t)+1
µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t) 0
0 −µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)
,
Dˆ1(t) =
(
0 −P2(t)
µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
−P2(t)
µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t) 0
)
,
Fˆ1(t) =
(
0
(µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)2
P 22 (t)P1(t)(µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)2
P 22 (t)P1(t) 0
)
,
Fˆ2(t) =
(
0 − 1
R1(t)
− 1
R1(t)
0
)
, Sˆ1(t) =
(
0 −P2(t)
−P2(t) 0
)
,
by Theorem 4.4, we can get
c¯2(t) = −
[
Bˆ1(t) + Π2(t)Bˆ2(t)
]⊤
Y (t)
R2(t)
−
Bˆ⊤2 ϕ˜(t)
R2(t)
, (5.11)
where (Y¯ (·), Z¯(·)) satisfy the following 2-dimensional BSDE:

−dY (t) =
{[(
−r(t)− P2(t)
R1(t)
0
− P2(t)
R2(t)
−r(t)− P2(t)
R1(t)
)
+
(
0 − 1
R1(t)
− 1
R1(t)
− 1
R2(t)
)
Π2(t)
]
Y (t)
+
(
−1−P 2
2
(t)P 2
1
(t)−P2(t)P1(t)
P1(t)P2(t)+1
µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t) 0
0 −µ(t)−r(t)
σ(t)
)
Z(t)
+
(
0 − 1
R1(t)
− 1
R1(t)
− 1
R2(t)
)
ϕ˜(t)
}
dt− Z(t)dW (t),
Y (T ) = ξˆ,
(5.12)
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Π1(·) and Π2(·) satisfy the 2-dimensional Riccati equations (4.29), (4.34) respectively, and
(ϕ˜(·), φ˜(·), η˜(·)) satisfy the 2-dimensional FBSDE (4.35), (4.30).
Thus, (c¯1(·), c¯2(·)) determined by (5.6) and (5.11) is a Stackelberg equilibrium point of our
game problem of BSDEs. Moreover, by a dual technique similar to [9], from (4.6) we have
Y (t) = E
[
ξˆΓt(T ) +
∫ T
t
{(
0 − 1
R1(s)
− 1
R1(s)
− 1
R2(s)
)
ϕ˜(s)
}
Γt(s)ds
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
, (5.13)
where for t ∈ [0, T ], Γt(·) is the unique solution to

dΓt(s) =
[(
−r(s)− P2(s)
R1(s)
0
− P2(s)
R2(s)
−r(s)− P2(s)
R1(s)
)
+
(
0 − 1
R1(s)
− 1
R1(s)
− 1
R2(s)
)
Π2(s)
]
Γt(s)ds
+
(
−1−P 2
2
(s)P 2
1
(s)−P2(s)P1(s)
P1(s)P2(s)+1
µ(s)−r(s)
σ(s) 0
0 −µ(s)−r(s)
σ(s)
)
Γt(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Γt(t) = 1,
or explicitly,
Γt(s) = exp
{∫ s
t
[(
−r(τ)− P2(τ)
R1(τ)
0
− P2(τ)
R2(τ)
−r(τ)− P2(τ)
R1(τ)
)
+
(
0 − 1
R1(τ)
− 1
R1(τ)
− 1
R2(τ)
)
Π2(τ)
+
1
2
(
−1−P 2
2
(τ)P 2
1
(τ)−P2(τ)P1(τ)
P1(τ)P2(τ)+1
µ(τ)−r(τ)
σ(τ) 0
0 −µ(τ)−r(τ)
σ(τ)
)2 ]
dτ
+
∫ s
t
(
−1−P 2
2
(τ)P 2
1
(τ)−P2(τ)P1(τ)
P1(τ)P2(τ)+1
µ(τ)−r(τ)
σ(τ) 0
0 −µ(τ)−r(τ)
σ(τ)
)
Γt(τ)dW (τ)
}
, s ∈ [t, T ].
(5.14)
Then the optimal initial wealth reserve y¯(0) is the second component of the following 2-dimensional
vector
Y (0) = E
[
ξˆΓ0(T ) +
∫ T
0
{(
0 − 1
R1(t)
− 1
R1(t)
− 1
R2(t)
)
ϕ˜(t)
}
Γ0(t)dt
]
. (5.15)
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied a new class of Stackelberg game of BSDEs, with deterministic
coefficients and convex control domain. Necessary and sufficient conditions of the optimality
for the follower and the leader are first given for the general problem. Then an LQ Stackelberg
game of BSDEs is investigated under standard assumptions. The state feedback representation
for the optimal control of the follower is first given via two Riccati equations, a BSDE and
a SDE. Then the leader’s problem is formulated as an optimal control problem of FBSDE
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with the control-independent diffusion term. Two high-dimensional Riccati equations, a high-
dimensional BSDE and a high-dimensional SDE are introduced to represent the state feedback
for the optimal control of the leader. The solvability of the four Riccati equations are discussed.
Theoretic results are applied to an optimal consumption rate problem of two players in the
financial market.
An outstanding open problem to study is the Stackelberg game of BSDEs where all the
coefficients are random (as in [36]). In this case, the Riccati equations become nonlinear BSDEs
(rather than ODEs as in this paper), and the solvability of them is very challenging to prove.
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